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Abstract
What would happen if the current US campaign ￿nance system,
mostly based on private donations, were replaced by a public funding
scheme of the same magnitude? It has been argued that public funding
would deprive voters of useful information, but this can only be true
if private donations are somehow targeted to ￿ better￿candidates. Us-
ing a survey-based dataset about the e⁄ectiveness of state legislators
￿We thank Stephen Ansolabehere, Stephen Coate, Raphael Franck, Hans Peter Gr￿ner,
Valentino Larcinese, Chappell Lawson, William Leblanc and seminar participants at the
Silvaplana Workshop in Political Economy, the APSA Conference and the MIT Political
Science WIP seminar for useful comments.
1in North Carolina, we ask what voters can learn about the charac-
teristics of a legislator from the amount and pattern of contributions
received during the campaign. The total amount that a candidate
receives is a positive, but weak, predictor of that candidate￿ s e⁄ec-
tiveness. However, the sum of contributions below a given threshold
($2,000) is a positive and strong signal of e⁄ectiveness, while the sum
of contributions above such threshold is a negative signal of e⁄ective-
ness. We also ￿nd that only contributions from organizations (rather
then individuals, parties, or own money) convey a positive signal. In
sum, our evidence contradicts the informational argument in favor of
private funding when contributions are large or when they come from
individuals and parties.
1 Introduction
Campaign ￿nance regulation is a controversial topic. Supporters of stricter
rules usually argue that the mixing of money and politics may cause a num-
ber of negative outcomes: politicians spend too much time fundraising, they
modify their policy stance in order to attract donations, or they give prefer-
ential treatement to donors, thus skewing political outcomes in favor of the
wealthy and the organized. Another charge is that campaign ￿nance exac-
erbates the incumbency advantage, which in turn makes elected leaders less
accountable to voters.1
Instead, supporters of weak or no regulation usually make use of three
lines of argument: a pragmatic one (it is better to have legal campaign con-
tributions rather than illegal ones), a constitutional one (limits on campaign
￿nance constitute a violation of the First Amendment on free speech),2 and
an informational one (campaign ￿nance is an e⁄ective instrument to provide
voters with useful political information). A forceful summary of the informa-
tional argument is provided by Bradley A. Smith, a commissioner with the
Federal Election Commission:3
1See Levitt [9] for a critical survey of campaign ￿nance reform proposals.
2In Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between campaign contri-
butions and campaign expenditures, ruling that limits on the latter do violate free speech
and are therefore unconstitutional, while limits on the former are constitutional.
3Congressional testimony, February 27, 1997, House Subcommittee on the Constitution.
Available from: http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bs022797.html. Bradley joined the
FEC in 2000.
2￿[...] the fact of the matter is that, more than ever in Amer-
ican society, communicating in the political realm requires the
expenditure of money. Money is not an evil in politics ￿it is a
source of information to voters. E⁄orts to regulate the ￿ ow of
money in politics over the past 20 years have done much more
than money ever did to distort the political system and create
a public distrust of government. It is now time to try a new
approach ￿ that is, it is time to deregulate politics. There is
simply no a priori method to say what is fair or not fair ￿how
much groups should be able to spend, or what kind of advocacy
they can spend it on. The bureaucracy that has been established
to regulate politics is sti￿ ing grassroots advocacy and political
communication.￿
The informational argument in favor of campaign ￿nance is based upon
two logical steps. First, as Bradley states, money must be ￿a source of in-
formation to voters.￿But this is not su¢ cient, because private contributions
could be replaced by a system of public funding in which candidates received
the same amounts, subject to the same restrictions on spending (if any), that
they would have received under the private system. This shift can potentially
keep the source of information to voters but it would avoid the alleged nega-
tive side e⁄ects highlighted above. Many countries, especially in Europe, rely
on generous public campaign ￿nancing. In the U.S. public ￿nancing plays a
large role in presidential campaigns and in some states (e.g. Minnesota and
New Jersey).4
A second logical step is therefore necessary to complete the informational
argument: a given amount of private contributions must be more e⁄ective
than the same amount of public funding in conveying information to voters.
In a public system, the distribution of campaign funds among candidates
could only be based on pre-determined criteria. Instead, with private contri-
butions, the allocation of campaign money is at the discretion of donors. If
donors are more likely to give money to high-quality candidates ￿whatever
the de￿nition of quality may be ￿then a private campaign ￿nance system has
a potential informational advantage over a public one. If, however, private
contributions do not tend to go to better candidates, then shifting to a public
4Obviously, replacing private funds with public funds would impose an additional tax
burden. However, the overall amount of campaign spending in the U.S. is extremely low
relative to the size of government (Ansolabehere, de Figuereido, and Snyder [1]).
3funding system that provides the same overall amount of money would not
deprive voters of useful information.
Hence, a key question to evaluate the strength of the informational ar-
gument is: What does the amount of campaign money that a candidate
receives say about that candidate￿ s characteristics? In particular, do ￿bet-
ter￿candidates receive more money? One can also specialize the question
to di⁄erent classes of campaign funds. For regulatory purposes, it would
be particularly interesting to know whether the informational value of cam-
paign money varies according to the size of the donation made and to the
characteristics of the donor.
To the best of our knowledge, this set of empirical questions has not
yet been addressed. The vast empirical literature on campaign ￿nance has
not attempted to estimate the informational bene￿t of campaign ￿nance.
It has mostly focused on the policy distortions caused by campaign ￿nance
(is there a link between private contributions and policy making?) and on
the electoral e⁄ectiveness of campaign money (are candidates more likely
to win if they receive more money?). Our empirical exercise is inspired
by the theoretical literature on campaign ￿nance with rational voters (e.g.
Potters et al. [11], Prat [13], [14], Coate [4], [5], Gerber [6] and Ashworth
[3]). This body of work identi￿es a trade-o⁄ between a policy distortion
and an informational bene￿t, both due to the presence of private campaign
￿nance. In equilibrium, high-quality candidates receive more contributions
than low-quality candidates, and this money is used to provide voters with
information about candidates￿quality. However, candidates may need to
distort their policy choices (away from voters￿interests) in order to attract
private donations. The overall welfare e⁄ect of allowing private donations
depends on the relative magnitudes of the policy cost and the informational
bene￿t. The goal of our paper is to provide a ￿rst assessment of the positive
side of this trade-o⁄.5
We use a dataset collected by the North Carolina Center for Public Pol-
icy Research (NC Center), which attempts to measure the ￿e⁄ectiveness￿
of North Carolina state legislators. The Center asks about 500 legislators,
lobbyists, and journalists to assess the e⁄ectiveness of each legislator in the
current legislative session. Every respondent is asked to provide a ranking of
all legislators. Our data covers six electoral cycles, from 1990 to 2000. The
5In the conclusion, we will return in more detail to the connection between our ￿ndings
and the existing literature on campaign ￿nance.
4North Carolina e⁄ectiveness score can be taken to represent the consensus
view of political insiders on legislators￿quality. We also have information on
campaign contributions for every North Carolina legislator.
We put ourselves in the shoes of North Carolina voters who are trying
to evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of their representatives, which we take to be
proxied by the NC Center ranking. We suppose that voters do not observe
the ranking directly, but they may have other kinds of information about
incumbents. We consider two classes of voters and four campaign ￿nance
information scenarios. The two classes of voters di⁄er according to their
knowledge of biographical and professional information about the incumbent
candidates. Uninformed voters are only aware of easily observable charac-
teristics of representatives, i.e. their gender and their party a¢ liation, while
informed voters, on top of gender and party a¢ liation, also know age, race,
profession, tenure of their representatives, and whether the representative
belongs to the majority party and/or holds key o¢ ces in the legislature. The
campaign ￿nance information scenarios are: (1) the voter has no informa-
tion about campaign contributions; (2) the voter knows the total amount
of contributions that each representative receives; (3) the voter also knows
what amount comes from small contributions (less than $2,000) or large (over
$2,000); (4) the voter knows the source of contributions received (candidate￿ s
own money, party money, funds from organizations, funds from individuals).
We analyze every combination of voter types and campaign ￿nance infor-
mation scenarios, and we obtain four main results. First, the total amount of
contributions that a candidate receives is a useful predictor of the candidate￿ s
e⁄ectiveness ranking both for the Senate and the House, but only in the eyes
of uninformed voters. However, this e⁄ect is small. To increase her ranking
(in the eyes of uninformed voters) by one percentage point, a House represen-
tative must spend an additional $16,000 (the median amount of contributions
received by a House representative is just $24,600). The equivalent ￿gure is
around $32,000 for a senator (median amount of contributions: $37,500). On
the other hand, in the case of informed voters, the correlation between e⁄ec-
tiveness and total contributions received, albeit positive, is not statistically
di⁄erent from zero.
Second, the ability to disaggregate between small and large contributions
(scenario 3) is particularly useful, for both chambers and for both classes
of voters. The informational bene￿t of moving from scenario 2 to 3 tends
to be greater than the informational bene￿t of moving from scenario 1 to
2. Small contributions are a strong positive predictor of e⁄ectiveness: House
5representatives only need an additional $5,500 in small money to increase
(again in the eyes of uninformed voters) their ranking of one percentage
point. Senators only need $6,100. Instead, the striking result is that large
contributions are negatively related to candidate￿ s e⁄ectiveness. This is true
for both chambers and for all classes of voters. Only in the case of an unin-
formed voter trying to evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of his House representative,
is the correlation with large contributions still negative, but not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero.
Third, it is extremely useful to disaggregate total contributions according
to their source (scenario 4). In particular, contributions from organizations
(both pro￿t and nonpro￿t ones) are strongly and positively correlated with
legislator e⁄ectiveness. This holds for both chambers and for all classes of
voters. In the eyes of uninformed voters, House representatives only need
an additional $2,400 in funds from organizations in order to increase their
ranking by one percentage point. The corresponding ￿gure for Senators
amounts to $3,400. On the other hand, the e⁄ectiveness of a representative
in the House is negatively related to the amount of donations from party
sources and from private individuals, with the former having a larger e⁄ect
than the latter. In general, these negative correlations are not statistically
signi￿cant in the case of Senators.
Fourth, the explanatory power of campaign ￿nance information is lower
than the explanatory power of the other forms of voter information that we
consider. The informational value of passing from the uninformed voter case
to the informed voter case (i.e. learning about the candidate￿ s race, age,
tenure, profession, key o¢ ces held, and whether she belongs to the majority
party) appears to be larger than any informational bene￿t that can be gained
through campaign ￿nance information.
The results about the size and the source of campaign funds are clari￿ed
by partitioning total contributions along these two classi￿cation grids at the
same time, i.e. by looking at small and large contributions from the four dif-
ferent sources mentioned above. It turns out that small contributions from
organizations are strongly and positively correlated with legislator e⁄ective-
ness for both chambers and both classes of voters, while large contributions
from organizations are positively and signi￿cantly correlated with legislator
e⁄ectiveness only in the eyes of uninformed voters in the House. On the other
hand, both small and large contributions from political parties are signi￿-
cantly and negatively correlated with e⁄ectiveness in the case of the House,
while for the Senate this holds only for large contributions. Finally, for both
6chambers, only large contributions from private individuals are signi￿cantly
and negatively correlated with legislator e⁄ectiveness.
Our empirical exercise on the informativeness of campaign ￿nance is based
on the likely unrealistic assumptions that voters are able to: (1) observe the
amounts of contributions that all incumbent candidates receive, and in some
cases the actual sources of these contributions; and (2) use that information
e¢ ciently to make inferences about candidates￿e⁄ectiveness. This assump-
tion stacks the deck in favor of an informational role for private campaign
￿nance. If voters only observed imperfect signals of contributions (such as
the number of TV ads they see) or if they were boundedly rational in the way
they process this information, then we should expect the amount of infor-
mation generated by private campaign spending to be lower than under our
assumptions. In this sense, our estimates should be seen as upper bounds on
the informational value of private campaign ￿nance.6
The main overall lesson of our exercise is that, at least according to our
evidence, certain types of private funding provide no informational bene￿t
(and perhaps an informational cost). This is true for large contributions and
for contributions from organizations, individuals, and own money. For these
types of funds, there appears to be no trade-o⁄between informational bene￿t
and policy cost. It is hard to see why one would not want to replace these
funds with public funds of the same amount.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data sources
and Section 3 reports the results of our analysis. Section 4 relates our ￿ndings
to the existing literature and concludes
2 Data
2.1 Some institutional background
The North Carolina legislature (the General Assembly) consists of two cham-
bers: a House of Representatives with 120 members and a Senate with 50
members. All members are elected every two years, for two-year terms. The
General Assembly is typically described a hybrid -a partially professional,
6Of course, one should also keep in mind that our results may underestimate the in-
formational bene￿t because our measure of e⁄ectiveness may contain noise and because
voters may value other aspects of a candidate￿ s personality, such as morality or ideology.
7partially amateur legislature7. In 2001 each member received a salary of
$13,951 plus a $104 per diem for living expenses. Legislative leaders earned
substantially more -e.g., the Speaker of the House was paid a salary of $38,151
together with an expense allowance of $16,956.
Regular legislative sessions are biennial and convene in January following
each election. The Democratic Party dominated the North Carolina General
Assembly until recently. During the 1990-1999 period Democrats held 61%
of all state legislative seats. However, in 1994 Republicans won control of
the state House for the ￿rst time in 100 years. They won again in 1996, but
then lost control in 1998.
Internally, the legislature is mainly organized along party lines. The ma-
jority party controls all committee chairs8, but some vice-chairs and sub-
committee chairs are left to the minority. Electorally, party organizations in
North Carolina are stronger than in most other southern states, but still rank
just below the U.S. average (see, e.g., Cotter, et al., 1984). Finally, More-
house (1981) classi￿ed North Carolina as a state in which pressure groups
are strong.
2.2 Data on Legislator E⁄ectiveness
As mentioned in the introduction, we take the data on legislator e⁄ectiveness
from the North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research (NC Center), an
independent nonpro￿t organization. At the end of each regular legislative ses-
sion, the NC Center asks state legislators, lobbyists and legislative liaisons,
and capital news correspondents to rate each member of the General As-
sembly according to their ￿e⁄ectiveness￿ . The NC Center has continuously
conducted this survey since 1977. The sample of insiders being interviewed
comprises all 170 legislators, all lobbyists registered in the state capital and
residing in North Carolina (250-325 lobbyists), and all journalists who reg-
ularly cover the General Assembly (35-45 journalists): this amounts to a
total sample size of 475-550. Every two years The NC Center publishes a
handbook (Article II: A Guide to the N.C. Legislature), which contains the
7In fact, in 1986-88 the North Carolina legislature was ranked 22nd by Squire￿ s [15]
index of legislative professionalism.
8Apart from the question on legislator e⁄ectiveness, in its survey the NC Center asks
respondents to name the ￿ve or six ￿most powerful￿committees in both houses. Such list
almost always included Appropriations, Finance, Judiciary I, Rules, and Education (the
latter one as of 1989).
8ranking of legislators, as derived from these ratings.
Here follows a quote from the handbook, which well explains how -
according to the NC Center- respondents should interpret the e⁄ectiveness
concept:
￿[...] Ratings were to be based on their participation in com-
mittee work, their skill at guiding bills through ￿ oor debate, their
general knowledge and expertise in special ￿elds, the respect they
command from their peers, the enthusiasm with which they ex-
ecute various legislative responsibilities, the political power they
hold (either by virtue of o¢ ce, longevity, or personal attributes),
their ability to sway the opinion of fellow legislators, and their
aptitude for the overall legislative process.￿(From Article II: A
Guide to the 1991-1992 N.C. Legislature, p. 212.)
Similarly to what done by Padr￿ i Miquel and Snyder [10], we invert
the original ranking measure, so that higher values of our dependent variable
correspond to greater e⁄ectiveness. Also, in order to make results more easily
comparable across the two chambers, we normalise our e⁄ectiveness measure
on a common 0-100 scale.
2.3 Data on campaign ￿nance
We match the e⁄ectiveness measure with data on campaign ￿nance contribu-
tions received by legislators running for reelection to the General Assembly.
Such data comes from the North Carolina State Board of Elections9. Here,
detailed pieces of information regarding contributions received by candidates
running for the General Assembly are available in electronic format, begin-
ning with the 1990 elections.
We aggregate this data to create a set of campaign ￿nance ￿gures for each
candidate in each election year. All ￿gures are in real terms, i.e. they are
translated into 2000 dollars. First, we calculate the total amount of contri-
butions received by candidate j in election t. To provide a cleaner measure
of this, which should be independent of the timing of received contributions,
we exclude all bank transactions from the computation, in particular interest
rate payments.
9See the URL: http://www.sboe.state.nc.us/, under the ￿data and statistics￿head-
ing.
9Second, we calculate the total amounts of contributions which are respec-
tively above and below a ￿xed threshold of $2,00010. When doing this, we
take into account the fact that some contributors may in fact donate in sepa-
rate installments: if the total amount donated to candidate j by contributor
i for election t is above the threshold, our procedure classi￿es this as a large
contribution, even if each installment, separately considered, is below the
$2,000 threshold.
Third, we distinguish total campaign ￿nance contributions according to
their source. We consider four categories of donors: the candidate herself,
her political party, organizations (both pro￿t and nonpro￿t ones) and indi-
viduals.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics about this campaign ￿nance
data. We separately show ￿gures about the Lower House and the Senate.
As we are matching campaign ￿nance data with information on legislator
e⁄ectiveness, the tables refer to incumbent candidates, i.e. those for which
an e⁄ectiveness score is available. In all cases (total contributions, small and
large contributions, total contributions classi￿ed according to the source)
and for both chambers the distribution of funds received by candidates is
positively skewed, as witnessed by the fact that for each category the average
contribution is larger than the median one. The median amount of total
contributions to an incumbent candidate in the House is about $24,600, while
the average one is about $47,000. The median sum of contributions received
by an incumbent candidate in the Senate is slightly below $37,500, with the
average one almost reaching $77,000.
2.4 Other data
When constructing the information set enjoyed by di⁄erent class of voters, we
make use of data on gender, age, race, party a¢ liation, tenure of incumbent
legislators, and key o¢ ces held by them. These pieces of information are
taken from the NC Center￿ s Article II guides and various editions of the
North Carolina Manual. In particular, the tenure variable is de￿ned as the
number of terms a given representative has continuously served in the House
or Senate. The count restarts in case a representative switches from the
Lower House to the Senate (or vice versa).
10Varying this threshold ($1,500, $2,500 and $3,000) indeed produces qualitatively sim-
ilar results.
10We use an ordinal variable to measure the relevance of the posts held
by a candidate in the current legislature. This variable takes on a value of
￿ve if the representative is Speaker or Speaker pro tempore, a value of four
if she is President pro tempore or Majority Leader, three if she is Minority
Leader, two if she is Majority or Minority Whip, one if she is chair of some
top committee, and zero otherwise.
3 Results
We analyze both chambers of the North Carolina State Assembly. The basic
speci￿cation is as follows:
Rjt = ￿
0cjt + ￿
0xjt + ￿j + ￿jt
where Rjt is the normalised e⁄ectiveness ranking given to the incumbent
candidate j at time t (regarding her performance during the past legislature),
xjt is a vector of candidate characteristics that possibly vary across time, ￿j is
an individual e⁄ect and ￿jt is an idiosyncratic error. The focus of our analysis
is on cjt, which is a vector containing information on contributions received
by candidate j during the electoral campaign taking place at time t. We
consider four di⁄erent scenarios regarding the campaign ￿nance information
available to voters:
1. No information about campaign contributions;
2. Total amount of contributions received by each representative;
3. Total amount of small contributions (less than $2,000) and total amount
of large contributions (at least $2,000);
4. Total amount of contributions disagreggated by source (own money,
party funds, funds from organizations, all other contributions).
The exact form of the cjt vector varies across these scenarios.
Our results, based on a random e⁄ects speci￿cation, are shown in Tables
2 and 3. Table 2 corresponds to the case of an uninformed voter - i.e. a voter
who observes only gender and party a¢ liation of representatives. Table 3 is
for the case of an informed voter - i.e. one who observes what the uninformed
11type knows, plus age, race, profession11, tenure, key o¢ ces held in the past
legislature, and whether the representative￿ s party had the majority. In both
tables we present estimates for both the Lower House and the Senate.
Rather than discussing each regression individually, it is more instructive
to compare the role of the same variables across treatments. First, consider
the coe¢ cient on total campaign contributions in Scenario 2. For both cham-
bers and both classes of voters, the estimated coe¢ cient is positive. However,
its strength decreases when voters become more informed. It is also lower
for the Senate. For informed voters in both chambers, the coe¢ cient is not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
The estimates imply that an increase of $1,000 in the campaign chest of a
House representative would lead uninformed voters to predict an increase of
0.062 percentage points in her ranking. Put di⁄erently, a House representa-
tive who wishes to go up one percentage point in the ranking of uninformed
voters must ￿nd an additional
$1;000
0:062 = $16;100. To put this in perspec-
tive, the median amount of contributions received by a House representative
is $24,600. The equivalent ￿gure for a senator is $32,250 (and the median
contribution amount is $37,500).
When we move to scenario 3, the coe¢ cient on small money is signi￿cant
at the 1% level for both classes of voters and for both chambers. As before,
its estimate is higher for uninformed voters and for the House. Now, money
is much more informative than in scenario 2. A House representative who
wishes to go up a percentage point in the ranking of uninformed voters must
￿nd only an additional $5,500 in small money (the median amount of small
money received by a House representative is $21,000). The equivalent ￿gure
for a senator is $6,100 (median amount of small money: $32,000). Even in
the case of informed voters is the magnitude of the correlation sizeable: in
order to increase her e⁄ectiveness ranking by one percentage point, a House
representative needs an additional $9,200 in small money, while a Senator
would need almost the same amount, i.e. $9,500.
Instead, the coe¢ cient on large money is negative (and signi￿cant for all
cases except uninformed voters in the House). The point estimate of the
amount of large money needed to make the ranking of a representative go
down of a percentage point ranges from $12,000 (for an uninformed voter in
11In practice, it turns out that the key distinction is whether the representative is a
lawyer or not. We thus simplify the exposition by replacing profession with a dummy
variable for lawyers.
12the Senate) to $23,800 (for an informed voter in the House).
In scenario 4, there is a strong and positive correlation between the rank-
ing measure and the amount of funds from organizations. Such correlation is
statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level for all class of voters and both cham-
bers, and the estimated coe¢ cient is large in magnitude. If one focuses on
uninformed voters, it is su¢ cient for a House representative to raise an ad-
ditional $2,400 in funds from organizations in order to increase her ranking
by one percentage point (the median amount of funds from organizations
received by House representatives is $13,000). The corresponding ￿gure for a
Senator is $3,400 (median amount of organizations￿money: $19,800). Even
in the case of an informed voter is the correlation estimated to be large:
the necessary increase in organizations￿funds to obtain a percentage point
increase in the e⁄ectiveness ranking amounts to $5,700 and $6,000, in the
House and in the Senate respectively.
Party funds are signi￿cantly and negatively correlated with legislator ef-
fectiveness for both classes of voters in the Lower House, while such corre-
lation is mildly statistically signi￿cant for uninformed voters in the Senate.
The point estimate of the amount of party funds needed to make the ranking
of a House representative go down of a percentage point ranges from $3,000
(uninformed voters) to $5,600 (informed ones). Similarly, contributions from
individuals are signi￿cantly and negatively correlated with legislator e⁄ec-
tiveness for both classes of voters in the House, while the correlation, albeit
negative, is never statistically signi￿cant in the case of Senators. The size
of the correlation is smaller than the one found for party money: in the
eyes of uninformed voters, the amount of private individuals￿money needed
to decrease the ranking of a House representative by one percentage point
amounts to $19,20012.
Finally, the coe¢ cients on own funds are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero in any of the four cases being studied.
A clear pattern has emerged. Total contributions have a mild positive
relation with e⁄ectiveness, which is the composition of two e⁄ects with op-
posite signs. Small contributions have a strong positive e⁄ect, while large
contributions have a negative e⁄ect. The mild positive relation of total con-
tributions with e⁄ectiveness can be also analysed by looking at the partition
12As more thoroughly discussed in section 3.1, it turns out that are large (i.e. above
$2,000) contributions from parties and private individuals signi￿cantly and negatively
correlated with e⁄ectiveness for both chambers and both classes of voters.
13of funds according to the source: funds from organizations are strongly and
positively correlated with the e⁄ectiveness measure, while funds from politi-
cal parties and private individuals are negatively correlated, signi￿cantly so
for the House.
How much information on e⁄ectiveness do voters gain when they have
campaign ￿nance information? Table 4 reports 16 R-squared values (the
￿gures written in large, regular characters) corresponding to the two classes
of voters and four campaign ￿nance information scenarios for the House and
for the Senate. Obviously, the (unadjusted) R-square coe¢ cient increases
when one adds information, either by looking at a more informed class of
voters within the same scenario or by examining a more informative scenario
for the same class of voters. It must be however noted that scenario 3 is
not nested within scenario 4; on the other hand, scenario 2 is nested within
both scenario 3 and 4 (which correspond to alternative partitions of total
contributions received by candidates).
Every shift downwards or rightwards in Table 5 corresponds to adding
one or more right-hand variables to the previous regression, again with the
exception of the move from scenario 3 to scenario 4. Hence, it is possible
to perform an F-test between each pair of neighboring cells, and between
scenario 2 and scenario 4. The ￿gures written in small italic font correspond
to P-values for the F-statistics computed for a pair of neighboring cells.
For example, look at informed voters in the Senate and compare scenario
2 (R2 = 52:49%) and scenario 3 (R2 = 55:29%). The P-value of the F-
statistics is 0.001. Regarding the P-values on the left of scenario 4, they
correspond to the F-tests between scenario 2 and 4.
Table 4 highlights several patterns. Firstly, moving between the two
classes of voters is, in general, more useful from an informational view-
point than moving between campaign ￿nance information scenarios. All 8
F-statistics for vertical comparisons are highly signi￿cant, while some of the
12 F-statistics for horizontal comparisons are not. The most powerful in-
formational treatment appears to be the shift from uninformed to informed
voters. This is particularly striking in the House, where in scenario 1, the
R-squared for uninformed voters is 3:57% while that for informed voters is
43:53%. Campaign ￿nance information can make up for only a small fraction
of this gap: the R-squared for uninformed voters in scenario 4 is 20:89%. The
patterns are similar in the Senate, but less pronouced. These ￿ndings put
an upper bound to the importance of campaign ￿nance as an informational
channel.
14When we focus on horizontal comparisons, we notice that the di⁄erence
between scenarios 2 and 3 is always signi￿cant at the 1% level. The di⁄erence
between scenarios 2 and 4 is always statistically signi￿cant, at the 1% level
for both classes of voters in the House and uninformed ones in the Senate;
it is signi￿cant at 5% level for informed voters in the Senate. Instead, the
di⁄erence between scenarios 1 and 2 is not signi￿cant for informed voters in
both chambers.
To sum up, the overall picture emerging from Table 4 is: (1) campaign
￿nance information is useful, but less so than other (basic) types of informa-
tion; and (2) the most informative part of campaign ￿nance is the disaggre-
gation of total contributions according to the size and the source.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 are based upon a random e⁄ects speci￿cation. Tables
6 and 7 show results for uninformed and informed voters respectively (i.e.
they parallel Tables 2 and 3), but adopt a ￿xed e⁄ects design. The signs and
signi￿cance levels of coe¢ cients are broadly similar across the two designs.13
In addition, we examined the purely cross-sectional variation in the data
using the ￿between￿estimator, and ￿nd similar patterns but with even larger
coe¢ cients. In the interest of space we do not report these results, but they
are available upon request.
3.1 Size and source of contributions compared
As discussed above, the partition of total contributions according to size
and source gives voters a valuable amount of information about legislator
e⁄ectiveness. Two related questions stem from this ￿nding:
1. What is the relationship between the results about the size of contri-
butions (scenario 3) and the ones about the source thereof (scenario
4)?
2. Which of the two partitions provides voters with ￿more￿information
about the unobserved ranking of legislators?
In order to answer these questions, we classify total contributions ac-
cording to the size and the source at the same time (i.e. we obtain eight
campaign contributions ￿gures for each incumbent candidate in each year).
13The only notable exception occurs with organizations￿money for informed voters in
the Senate, which is no longer statistically signi￿cant with a ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation.
15Again considering both classes of voters and both chambers, we re-run the
regressions with this new scenario about campaign ￿nance information. Re-
sults are presented in Table 5, where each column corresponds to a di⁄erent
class of voters in the Lower House and in the Senate.
A consistent pattern emerges here, which helps explain the results regard-
ing scenario 3 and scenario 4. Firstly, small contributions from organizations
are strongly and positively correlated with legislator e⁄ectiveness. For both
classes of voters in the House and for uninformed ones in the Senate the
coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 1% level, and the size
of the e⁄ect is remarkably large. An incumbent candidate in the House,
who wants to increase her ranking by one percentage point in the eyes of
uninformed voters, needs only an additional $1,800 of small contributions
from organizations. An additional $3,800 is needed to achieve the same one
percentage point increase in the ranking if one considers the perception of
informed voters. Regarding the Senate, the needed increase in small money
from organizations ranges from $3,100 (uninformed voters) to about $7,500
(informed ones). In fact, large contributions from organizations are signif-
icantly (and positively) correlated with legislator e⁄ectiveness -at the 10%
level- only for uninformed voters in the House.
Turning to the other contribution sources, we ￿nd that in the House both
small and large funds from political parties are negatively related to legisla-
tor e⁄ectiveness, and signi￿cant at the 5% level or better. The magnitude of
the e⁄ect is pretty large: in the case of uninformed voters, a one percentage
point increase in the e⁄ectiveness ranking would be achieved by a reduction
of $1,400 in small party contributions. On the other hand, only large con-
tributions from individuals are signi￿cantly (and negatively) correlated with
the ranking measure.
In the Senate, only large contributions from political parties are signi￿-
cantly correlated with legislator e⁄ectiveness, with a negative sign. The fact
that in the Senate contributions from private individuals are not signi￿cantly
correlated with legislator e⁄ectiveness ￿nds an explanation when looking at
the double partition according to size and source. Indeed, large contributions
from private individuals are negatively and signi￿cantly correlated with our
measure of quality, while small contributions from the same type of source
are positively and signi￿cantly correlated with e⁄ectiveness.
Which partition of total contributions is more valuable to voters from
an informational standpoint? We answer this question by performing two
separate batteries of F-tests and reporting the associated P-values in Table
165. Firstly we test the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of all sources of small
and large contributions respectively are statistically the same, i.e. they vary
according to the contribution size and not according to the source. Secondly
we test whether the partial correlations (with legislator e⁄ectiveness) of the
di⁄erent sources of funds do not depend on the size thereof. In the case of the
Lower House, both the size and the source partition of total contributions
convey valuable information to voters, as witnessed by the small P-values of
the four F-tests. In the Senate as well both size and source of contributions
convey valuable information, even though the P-values of the F-tests are
sistematically larger than in the House.
4 Discussion and conclusions
One of the main challenges in the theoretical campaign ￿nance literature is
to provide a convincing theory of why and how campaign spending in￿ uences
voting decisions (see Prat [12] for a survey). Why should a voter be more
likely to vote for a candidate who spends more money? There are two main
strands of literature, both of them built on an informational story.
Some authors (Potters et al. [11], Prat [13], [14]) focus on the signalling
role of campaign ￿nance. For instance, Prat [13] assumes that candidates are
characterized by a non-directly observable quality parameter. First, lobbies
receive a signal about candidates￿quality and choose how much money to
contribute. Later, voters may observe a signal about candidate quality as
well. In equilibrium, lobbies are more willing to contribute to a candidate
associated to a positive signal, because voters are likely to receive a positive
signal as well. But then, in equilibrium the amount of money that a candidate
receives reveals the lobbies￿view about that candidate￿ s quality. A rational
voter is more likely to cast her ballot in favor of a candidate who receives a
large amount of contributions.14
The ￿rst approach is based on the idea that lobbies￿signals are non-
veri￿able. The only credible way to transmit them to voters is by money
burning. Other authors (Coate [4], [5] and Ashworth [3]) instead note that
certain types of information, such as the candidate￿ s record or characteristics,
14One may think that this signalling mechanism imposes an implausibly high demand
on the rationality of the electorate. However, voters need not understand the model or
follow this line of reasoning in a conscious way. For the signalling equilibrium to work,
voters just have to respond to advertising in a positive manner.
17are veri￿able. A candidate can make voters aware of his veri￿able attributes
(or his opponent￿ s attributes) through advertising. Candidates with positive
veri￿able characteristics stand to gain from advertising and are more willing
and able to receive money from lobbies. This approach also entails a potential
policy distortion due to the candidates￿desire to secure contributions.
Both classes of models predict that in equilibrium higher-quality can-
didates will receive more money than low-quality candidates. Hence, our
exercise can be seen as a reduced-form exploration of this key prediction.
Could we distinguish between these two informative-advertising approaches?
In the second approach, campaign spending conveys information only about
veri￿able candidate characteristics. Hence, if one controls for all relevant,
observable characteristics, there should be no remaining correlation between
candidate expenditure and candidate quality. In our case, this means that
the coe¢ cient of a regression of legislator e⁄ectiveness over campaign receipts
should be zero for an informed voter. This is indeed the case for the overall
amount of contributions. However, our data also reveal that the coe¢ cient
on contributions is positive and signi￿cant, even when voters are highly in-
formed, for certain sources of contributions. This seems to indicate that
the potential information that can be communicated is not limited to the
observable characteristics that we consider.15
In terms of the existing empirical literature, there are three main features
of candidates that have been found to be correlated with the amount and
pattern of campaign contributions received: incumbency, institutional power
and legislative entrepeneurship.
First, an important and well-known regularity is that incumbent can-
didates on average receive more campaign contributions than challengers
(see Jacobson [7]). This fact is typically coupled with the ￿nding that the
correlation between contributions received and electoral success is positive,
15A recent paper by Vanberg [16] studies, both theoretically and empirically, the oppor-
tunity of capping the size of the contribution that an individual can make. Every candidate
is assumed to be characterized by a two-dimensional type: one dimension is veri￿able and
the other is not. On the unveri￿able dimension, there is a con￿ ict of interest between
voters and a lobby. It is then shown that a candidate who receives large contributions is
more likely to have negative hidden characteristics. The model predicts that candidates
that rely on large contributions (controlling for the total amount of contributions they
receive) have less electoral success. However, data on the US House of Representatives
from 1990 to 2002 indicate no evidence of such a negative relation.
Vanberg￿ s set-up is consistent with our observation that small money is positively cor-
related with e⁄ectiveness and large money is negatively correlated.
18signi￿cant and robust for challengers only16.
Second, regarding incumbents, Ansolabehere and Snyder [2] use PAC con-
tributions as a metric of institutional power, both between di⁄erent political
institutions and between members of the same institution. The idea is that
interest groups, di⁄erently from other groups of donors, primarily act as in-
vestors when ￿nancing politicians￿campaigns, as they expect services and/or
policies in exchange for their contributions. Hence interest groups would tend
to donate more to politicians that have greater in￿ uence over the process
(possibly) leading to the approval and enactment of these desired policies
and services. They ￿nd for example that incumbents in the U.S. House
systematically receive more PAC contributions when moving onto powerful
committes like Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce. Our ￿ndings -
in particular, the positive correlation between organizations￿donations and
legislator e⁄ectiveness - are consistent with their results.
Third, Wawro [17] analyses the link between PAC contributions and leg-
islative ￿entrepeneurship￿in the U.S. House. He de￿nes an index of entre-
peneurship using bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship behavior. He ￿nds no
statistically signi￿cant relationship between this index and the total amount
of PAC contributions received by a representative. In contrast, we ￿nd a
strong and positive relationship between incumbents￿e⁄ectiveness and cam-
paign funds from organizations. How can we reconcile these two sets of
results? One possible explanation is that the index used by Wawro is a quite
noisy measure of legislator quality. Another possibility is that there is much
less variation in quality across incumbents in the U.S. House than in the
North Carolina General Assembly. This is plausible because the U.S. House
is a highly professional legislature, while the NC General Assembly is not.
While the variation across incumbents in the U.S. House might be small,
scholars typically argue that the variance in quality across non-incumbents
is large. Interestingly, when we look at non-incumbents for the U.S. House,
we see a strong relationship between contributions received and their quality,
as proxied for example by their previous o¢ ceholding. Averaging over the
period 1978-1998, non-incumbents who held previous o¢ ce (either as state
legislators or statewide executive o¢ cers) received more than twice as much
in total contributions as those who did not. The di⁄erence is even starker -
a three to one ratio - if one considers PAC contributions only.17
16See Jacobson [8].
17In 1992 dollars non-incumbents with previous o¢ ceholding received on average
19How do our ￿ndings relate to the informational argument invoked by
opponents of campaign ￿nance regulation? The amount of money that a
candidate receives appears to be increasing in positive personal character-
istics of the candidate, even though this e⁄ect is quite small. Hence, the
informational argument appears to be valid but weak. However, more im-
portantly, our results indicate that the informational bene￿ts are mostly due
to small contributions, and contributions from organizations, if one considers
the partition according to the source. Large contributions are a confounding
factor, since they are negatively correlated with candidate quality. This is
also true for funds from political parties and private individuals, at least in
the Lower House, and large contributions from parties and individuals in the
Senate.18 Since most of the restrictions on campaign donations that have
been introduced or proposed in the U.S. mainly apply to large contributions,
our ￿ndings put into question the validity of the informational argument as
a serious objection to such restrictions. On the basis of our analysis, it is
quite di¢ cult to argue that replacing large contributions with state funds
-which are assigned according to pre-determined criteria- would deprive vot-
ers of useful information. If anything, eliminating the noise created by large
contributions could increase the informative value of small ones.19
How can one interpret the results about the di⁄erent sources of contri-
butions? One possibility is that the organizations donating small funds to
candidates know approximatively as much about these candidates as the
group of political insiders interviewed by the NC Center. Regarding the
negative correlation of (large) party funds with legislator e⁄ectiveness, one
$460,000 in total contributions, as compared to an average of $240,000 for non-
o¢ ceholders. The corresponding ￿gures for PAC contributions are $130,000 and $40,000.
Jacobson [7] reports similarly large di⁄erences for the 1972 to 1978 period.
18Moreover, it is small contributions from organizations that drive the positive cor-
relation of interest group money with legislator e⁄ectiveness. Large contributions from
organizations are positively and signi￿cantly correlated with legislator e⁄ectiveness only
in the case of uninformed voters in the Lower House.
19Also, from the North Carolina taxpayer￿ s point of view, public funding of state leg-
islative campaigns would not be terribly expensive. In 2000, the total amounts of large
contributions accruing to candidates in the Lower House and in the Senate were around
$5,600,000 and $4,500,000 respectively. The corresponding ￿gures for total contributions
were $12,000,000 and $9,000,000. Since North Carolina total personal income in 2000 was
$218,668 million (BEA ￿gure), replacing large contributions with public funds would cost
less than 0.005% of total personal income. Replacing all private contributions would still
cost less than 0.01% of personal income.
20plausible explanation is the following: in order to win as many seats as pos-
sible, political parties help their weaker candidates - i.e. those who have low
e⁄ectiveness rankings and are unable to raise enough money from alternative
sources - transferring additional funds to them. The negative correlation of
funds from private individuals, and especially large ones, does not immedi-
ately ￿nd an intuitive political economy explanation20.
We already highlighted the limitations of our approach in the introduc-
tion. Given these caveats, a natural question arising here is to what extent
our ￿ndings about the relationship between campaign ￿nance and legislator
e⁄ectiveness in the North Carolina legislature would apply to other legislative
bodies. Our conjecture is that other partially professional, partially amateur
state legislatures could display the same type of correlations, with the pattern
of campaign money being capable of discriminating professional incumbents
from amateur ones. We are less sure about the applicability of these re-
sults to more thoroughly professional state legislatures (e.g. California or
New York). As we noted above, our analysis might apply to non-incumbent
candidates for the U.S. Congress. By extension, it might also apply to non-
incumbents in professional legislatures. Regarding incumbents, the pattern
of contributions - classi￿ed according to size and/or source - might provide
voters with relevant informational cues about legislator e⁄ectiveness even in
professional legislatures.
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23Table 1: Summary statistics on campaign finance
House
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
total contributions 652 47,006.48 24,613.29 84176.97 0 1,048,956
total contributions below 2000$ 652 33,125.11 20,974.51 40802.02 0 469,018
total contributions above 2000$ 652 13,881.37 2,195.03 51687.00 0 689,326
own funds 652 695.62 0.00 4071.78 0 95,001
party funds 652 4,094.30 263.50 14138.30 0 184,833
organizations' funds 652 20,508.47 13,078.10 28099.21 0 401,597
other contributors' funds   652 21,708.09 8,821.82 56527.29 0 765,413
own funds below $2000 652 372.77 0.00 1300.85 0 15,479
own funds above $2000 652 322.85 0.00 3868.85 0 95,001
party funds below $2000 652 953.64 184.11 4530.10 0 89,357
party funds above $2000 652 3,140.66 0.00 13306.89 0 184,833
organizations' funds below $2000 652 17,733.55 12,159.56 20775.27 0 263,412
organizations' funds above $2000 652 2,774.91 0.00 9893.99 0 138,185
other contributors' funds below $2000 652 20,260.72 8,747.60 46604.48 0 659,768
other contributors' funds above $2000 652 1,447.37 0.00 12940.17 0 205,584
Senate
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
total contributions 280 76,798.57 37,466.19 117694.6 0 1,101,603
total contributions below 2000$ 280 51,334.86 31,980.86 61971.5 0 521,566
total contributions above 2000$ 280 25,463.72 4,637.39 62600.0 0 580,037
own funds 280 1,274.87 0.00 6242.4 0 81,369
party funds 280 11,402.35 269.24 36707.8 0 274,279
organizations' funds 280 26,560.81 19,869.54 28041.8 0 225,523
other contributors' funds   280 37,560.55 12,607.58 80027.7 0 876,080
own funds below $2000 280 212.39 0.00 459.61 0 3,301
own funds above $2000 280 1,062.48 0.00 6245.74 0 81,369
party funds below $2000 280 1,818.24 102.82 9912.94 0 118,522
party funds above $2000 280 9,584.11 0.00 35590.62 0 274,015
organizations' funds below $2000 280 22,582.29 17,116.21 21688.54 0 159,523
organizations' funds above $2000 280 3,978.53 0.00 9186.59 0 66,000
other contributors' funds below $2000 280 33,217.21 12,308.94 57428.84 0 538,980
other contributors' funds above $2000 280 4,343.33 0.00 26733.14 0 337,100
Note: figures refer to incumbent candidates, in the Lower House and in the Senate respectively.[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
total contributions (thousands of $) - 0.062*** - - - 0.031*** - -
[0.011] [0.011]
total contributions below 2000$ - - 0.182*** - - - 0.165*** -
[0.032] [0.035]
total contributions above 2000$ - - -0.011 - - - -0.083*** -
[0.022] [0.031]
own funds - - - 0.276 - - - 0.066
[0.248] [0.213]
party funds - - - -0.336*** - - - -0.069*
[0.080] [0.035]
contributions from organizations - - - 0.419*** - - - 0.298***
[0.045] [0.056]
contributions from individuals - - - -0.052** - - - -0.025
[0.021] [0.020]
-1.991 -1.532 -1.21 -0.89 -5.785 -5.895 -7.208 -5.351
[4.172] [4.077] [3.906] [3.817] [6.359] [6.311] [5.921] [5.840]
10.558*** 11.197*** 11.997*** 13.277*** 34.318*** 32.934*** 33.590*** 33.273***
[3.219] [3.148] [3.027] [2.964] [4.699] [4.690] [4.382] [4.356]
41.502*** 38.157*** 34.845*** 34.043*** 24.448*** 22.998*** 19.395*** 19.236***
[2.618] [2.626] [2.665] [2.514] [3.957] [3.960] [3.812] [3.722]
Observations 652 652 652 652 280 280 280 280
Number of individuals 238 238 238 238 107 107 107 107
Notes: random effects regressions, with normalised legislative effectiveness as dependent variable. Standard errors in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the
1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
4 categories of 
donors
candidate is a woman
candidate belongs to the Democratic party
constant





Large and small 
money





Large and small 
money[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
total contributions (thousands of $) - 0.014 - - - 0.007 - -
[0.009] [0.009]
total contributions below 2000$ - - 0.109*** - - - 0.105*** -
[0.025] [0.030]
total contributions above 2000$ - - -0.042** - - - -0.075*** -
[0.017] [0.026]
own funds - - - 0.096 - - - 0.048
[0.194] [0.182]
party funds - - - -0.178*** - - - -0.035
[0.065] [0.030]
contributions from organizations - - - 0.174*** - - - 0.167***
[0.038] [0.050]
contributions from individuals - - - -0.027* - - - -0.027
[0.016] [0.018]
1.948 2.039 2.07 2.31 1.256 1.164 0.066 1.02
[3.335] [3.291] [3.172] [3.195] [5.106] [5.062] [4.950] [4.873]
0.143 0.388 0.784 2.258 27.691*** 27.430*** 28.152*** 27.998***
[2.787] [2.758] [2.670] [2.713] [3.931] [3.915] [3.823] [3.816]
candidate is black -12.266*** -11.887*** -10.606*** -12.489*** -8.906 -8.585 -7.474 -8.543
[4.255] [4.204] [4.061] [4.089] [5.587] [5.549] [5.419] [5.330]
candidate's age at the time of the elections -0.423*** -0.426*** -0.389*** -0.391*** -0.011 -0.003 -0.038 0
[0.120] [0.118] [0.115] [0.115] [0.167] [0.166] [0.162] [0.162]
candidate is a lawyer 18.677*** 18.767*** 18.463*** 19.183*** 13.497*** 13.487*** 12.143*** 12.697***
[3.895] [3.847] [3.713] [3.741] [3.977] [3.939] [3.861] [3.804]
no of previous terms in office 5.031*** 4.985*** 4.859*** 4.508*** 4.893*** 4.806*** 4.826*** 4.323***
[0.409] [0.406] [0.397] [0.410] [0.605] [0.608] [0.595] [0.607]
candidate belongs to the majority party 20.589*** 20.316*** 20.320*** 19.399*** ----
[1.275] [1.289] [1.289] [1.295]
3.654*** 3.169*** 3.137*** 2.288** 3.227*** 3.130*** 2.673*** 3.106***
[0.852] [0.923] [0.920] [0.935] [0.935] [0.958] [0.952] [0.967]
43.550*** 43.274*** 38.891*** 40.716*** 12.922 12.313 11.921 10.798
[6.475] [6.402] [6.292] [6.251] [9.781] [9.729] [9.494] [9.505]
Observations 652 652 652 652 280 280 280 280
Number of individuals 238 238 238 238 107 107 107 107





Large and small 
money





Large and small 
money
constant
Notes: random effects regressions, with normalised legislative effectiveness as dependent variable. Standard errors in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%
level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
4 categories of 
donors
candidate is a woman
candidate belongs to the Democratic party
post held by candidate during current legislatureTable 4: overall R squared and F-tests, House and Senate
5.A: House (F-tests in italics)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
no money total contributions big and small money 4 categories of donors
uninformed voters 3.57 0.000 9.98 0.000 14.29 0.000 20.89
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
informed voters 43.53 0.123 44.21 0.000 46.82 0.000 47.34
5.B: Senate (F-tests in italics)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
no money total contributions big and small money 4 categories of donors
uninformed voters 30.37 0.004 33.91 0.000 38.75 0.000 40.49
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
informed voters 51.61 0.439 52.49 0.001 55.29 0.035 55.78
Notes: rows correspond to the three different informational scenarios, while columns refer to information about campaign finance. Overall R squared are
reported on the junctions between rows and columns. P-values of the F-tests between one scenario and the other are reported in italics in the relevant cell. E.g.,
in the row about informed voters for the Senate, consider the figure in between the "no money" and the "total contributions" columns. The figure is 0.439: this is
the P-value for the test that the coefficient on total contributions is equal to zero. The only exception is with the P-values on the left of scenario [4], which are
referred to the F-tests between scenario [2] and [4], just because scenario [3] is not nested into scenario [4]. [1] [2] [1] [2]
contributions below $2000 - self -1.061 -0.906 -2.959 -1.339
[0.745] [0.592] [2.766] [2.349]
contributions below $2000 - party -0.717*** -0.424** -0.099 -0.077
[0.222] [0.182] [0.103] [0.087]
contributions below $2000 - organizations 0.554*** 0.262*** 0.320*** 0.134**
[0.063] [0.053] [0.070] [0.062]
contributions below $2000 - individuals and others 0.023 0.026 0.086* 0.098**
[0.031] [0.025] [0.045] [0.039]
contributions above $2000 - self 0.255 0.092 0.016 0.014
[0.258] [0.203] [0.210] [0.180]
contributions above $2000 - party -0.306*** -0.163** -0.102*** -0.079**
[0.084] [0.068] [0.039] [0.033]
contributions above $2000 - organizations 0.232* 0.074 0.178 0.21
[0.126] [0.099] [0.165] [0.140]
contributions above $2000 - individuals and others -0.371*** -0.252*** -0.210*** -0.257***
[0.111] [0.088] [0.077] [0.066]
P-value of the F-test: the source of funds does not matter 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.020
P-value of the F-test: the size of funds does not matter 0.000 0.003 0.078 0.010
gender, race, age, party controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 652 652 280 280
Number of individuals 238 238 107 107
Notes: random effects regressions, with normalised legislative effectiveness as dependent variable. Standard errors in brackets. *** indicates that the
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance. The first F-test whose P-values is reported has as its null
hypothesis that the coefficients of different sources of funds are the same, separately considering small and large contributions. The null hypothesis of the
second F-test is that the correlation of the different sources of funds does not depend on their size.
Table 5: explaining legislator Effectiveness with campaign contributions classified according to size and source, 
random effects regression
House Senate
Uninformed voters Informed voters Uninformed voters Informed voters[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
total contributions (thousands of $) - 0.053*** - - - 0.029** - -
[0.012] [0.012]
total contributions below 2000$ - - 0.115*** - - - 0.115*** -
[0.038] [0.044]
total contributions above 2000$ - - 0.019 - - - -0.045 -
[0.023] [0.038]
own funds - - - 0.246 - - - 0.349
[0.306] [0.481]
party funds - - - -0.242** - - - 0
[0.111] [0.045]
contributions from organizations - - - 0.379*** - - - 0.264***
[0.049] [0.060]
contributions from individuals - - - -0.059*** - - - -0.034
[0.022] [0.022]
20.694 16.457 17.7 19.72 ----
[15.589] [15.271] [15.251] [15.277]
38.729*** 38.634*** 36.370*** 33.608*** 50.614*** 48.388*** 45.823*** 44.430***
[8.902] [8.703] [8.781] [8.695] [0.886] [1.271] [1.769] [1.668]
Observations 652 652 652 652 280 280 280 280
Number of individuals 238 238 238 238 107 107 107 107





Large and small 
money





Large and small 
money
Notes: fixed effects regressions, with normalised legislative effectiveness as dependent variable. Standard errors in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at
the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
4 categories of 
donors
candidate belongs to the Democratic party
constant[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
total contributions (thousands of $) - 0.002 - - - -0.011 - -
[0.010] [0.011]
total contributions below 2000$ - - 0.051* - - - 0.078** -
[0.028] [0.036]
total contributions above 2000$ - - -0.025 - - - -0.086*** -
[0.017] [0.031]
own funds - - - 0.045 - - - 0.265
[0.230] [0.411]
party funds - - - -0.141* - - - -0.034
[0.084] [0.039]
contributions from organizations - - - 0.110*** - - - 0.074
[0.042] [0.056]
contributions from individuals - - - -0.024 - - - -0.028
[0.017] [0.019]
3.282 3.192 4.296 7.327 ----
[10.992] [11.020] [10.999] [11.519]
candidate's age at the time of the elections 1.645* 1.629* 1.616* 1.727* 3.281 3.657 4.68 3.485
[0.929] [0.935] [0.932] [0.936] [3.491] [3.510] [3.476] [3.590]
no of previous terms in office 1.571 1.591 1.55 0.978 -0.712 -1.247 -3.244 -1.258
[1.956] [1.962] [1.956] [1.966] [7.106] [7.125] [7.053] [7.274]
candidate belongs to the majority party 22.643*** 22.618*** 22.666*** 21.936*** ----
[1.302] [1.313] [1.309] [1.329]
1.920** 1.857* 1.803* 1.214 1.736* 1.937* 1.527 1.840*
[0.919] [0.998] [0.996] [1.014] [0.989] [1.008] [1.005] [1.017]
-64.138 -63.269 -64.262 -69.97 -142.578 -162.685 -220.366 -154.129
[47.594] [47.955] [47.803] [48.064] [187.826] [188.849] [187.153] [193.068]
Observations 652 652 652 652 280 280 280 280
Number of individuals 238 238 238 238 107 107 107 107
constant
Notes: fixed effects regressions, with normalised legislative effectiveness as dependent variable. Standard errors in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%
level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.
4 categories of 
donors
candidate belongs to the Democratic party
post held by candidate during current legislature





Large and small 
money





Large and small 
money